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JUDGE SONIA SOTOMAYOR’S TAX OPINIONS1 
 
Prof. Stephen B. Cohen, Georgetown Law School  
 
This article examines Judge Sonia Sotomayor’s three published 
opinions in cases involving federal taxation, one as a District Court 
judge and two as a Court of Appeals judge.  Two of the opinions deal 
with routine matters and will therefore be discussed only briefly.  The 
third opinion, which was reviewed by the Supreme Court, will be 
discussed at greater length.  Although Chief Justice Roberts, writing 
for the Supreme Court, affirmed the result in this third opinion, he 
criticized Judge Sotomayor’s reasoning (despite the fact that both the 
Solicitor General and the Department of the Treasury had endorsed 
it) and offered instead a different rationale.  After a careful reading, I 
find the rationale of Judge Sotomayor’s opinion as least as valid as, 
and probably preferable to, that of Chief Justice Roberts.  I also find 
Chief Justice Roberts’ criticism of Judge Sotomayor’s rationale 
logically flawed and therefore unwarranted.  
 
Judge Sotomayor’s first tax opinion, Toker v U.S., 982 F. Supp. 
197 (1997), written when she was a District Court judge, was affirmed 
without opinion by the Second Circuit, 133 F. 3d 908 (2d Cir. 1997).  
The taxpayers in Toker deducted losses for the years 1982, 1983, 
and 1984 in connection with a car leasing partnership.  After receiving 
a deficiency notice from the IRS for 1982, the taxpayers filed a 
petition contesting the deficiency with the U.S. Tax court.  Two years 
later, pursuant to a stipulation between the taxpayers and the IRS, 
the Tax Court affirmed the deficiency, which the taxpayers paid 
shortly thereafter.  After receiving additional deficiency notices from 
the IRS for 1983 and 1984, the taxpayers entered into a binding 
written agreement with the IRS to settle the dispute and pay the 
deficiencies.   
 
 Other participants in the car leasing partnership declined 
settlement offers from the IRS and contested asserted deficiencies 
before the Tax Court, where they ultimately prevailed.  The taxpayers 
                                       
1 I am grateful to Ken Bacon, Daniel Halperin, Laura Sager, and 
Ethan Yale for comments on an earlier draft of this article. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443215
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in Toker then filed suit in the District Court, claiming that the IRS had 
agreed to refund their payment of asserted deficiencies if other 
partners prevailed in litigation claiming the deductions.   
 
Judge Sotomayor’s opinion granted the government’s motion 
for summary judgment.  With respect to the 1982 deductions, Judge 
Sotomayor found that the District Court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction under § 6512(a), which provides that a taxpayer who files 
a petition with the Tax Court is precluded from suing to recover the 
disputed tax payment in another court.  
 
With respect to the 1983 and 1984 deductions, Judge 
Sotomayor ruled that the District Court had jurisdiction because the 
taxpayers did not previously petition the Tax Court regarding their 
1983 and 1984 tax liability.  However, she granted summary 
judgment because the written agreement with the IRS clearly and 
unequivocally indicated that they entered into a final, binding 
settlement.   
 
Judge Sotomayor rejected, as barred by the parole evidence 
rule, the taxpayers’ contention that the IRS agreed orally that if there 
was a later determination that the deductions were correct, they 
would be entitled to recover the payment of the deficiencies.  In 
reaching this conclusion, she followed decisions of the Second 
Circuit, barring parole evidence to interpret agreements between 
taxpayers and the IRS unless the written terms are ambiguous.     
 
Judge Sotomayor also dismissed the taxpayers’ contention that 
the parole evidence rule should be disregarded because they 
justifiably relied on fraudulent statements by IRS employees that the 
settlement agreement would not affect their substantive rights.  She 
cited the rule that justifiable reliance in fraud cases must consider 
whether the truth was readily ascertainable by the allegedly 
defrauded person.  She then noted that Mr. Toker, an attorney and a 
judge, could ascertain the true effect of the signed agreement simply 
by referring to the plain language describing the settlement 
agreement as a final, binding agreement. 
 
Judge Sotomayor’s second opinion involving federal taxation 
was as a Court of Appeals judge in Addington v. Commissioner, 205 
 3 
F.3d 54 (2nd Cir. 2000).  Her affirmance of a Tax Court decision in 
favor of the IRS was joined by then Chief Judge Ralph Winter and 
Senior Judge Jon Newman.  The taxpayers claimed that the Tax 
Court erred in upholding the IRS assessment of negligence and 
valuation overstatement penalties in connection with their 1981 and 
1982 tax returns.  The taxpayers invested in leasing partnerships that 
acquired plastics recycling equipment.  Although this equipment had 
a fair market value not in excess of $50,000, the taxpayers claimed 
tax deductions and credits based on assigning the equipment a value 
of over $1 million.    
 
Negligence penalties are imposed by § 6653 for “a lack of due 
care or a failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person would 
do under the circumstances.” Chimblo v. Commissioner, 177 F.3d 
119, 126 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Goldman v. Commissioner, 39 F.3d 
402, 406 (2d Cir. 1994).  Similarly, under § 6659(e), the IRS may 
waive the valuation overstatement penalty “on a showing by the 
taxpayer that there was a reasonable basis for the valuation . . . .”   
The taxpayers claimed that they should be relieved of both 
negligence and valuation overstatement penalties because of their 
reliance on the advice of a professor of tax law at New York 
University Law School and a tax attorney who helped prepare the 
equipment leasing partnership prospectus.  Judge Sotomayor ruled 
that it was unreasonable to rely on the law professor who stated to 
the taxpayers that he was uncertain whether the prospectus correctly 
valued the equipment and proposed that the taxpayers hire an 
independent appraiser.  She added that reliance on the opinion of the 
tax attorney who was involved in preparing the prospectus was also 
unjustified.  Therefore, she concluded, the imposition of penalties was 
valid. 
 
The taxpayers also contended that they should be afforded the 
same treatment as other investors in the partnership who were 
relieved of negligence penalties in settlement agreements with the 
IRS.  Judge Sotomayor rejected that argument, noting that the 
Commissioner made the same settlement offer to the taxpayers who 
refused it.   
 
Judge Sotomayor’s first two opinions involving taxation are 
thoroughly researched, well reasoned, and clearly written.  
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Nevertheless, the reasoning and results are unremarkable in the 
sense that it is difficult to imagine the cases coming out any other 
way.  Her third opinion, however, in William L. Rudkin Testamentary 
Trust v. Commissioner, 467 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2006), aff'd sub nom. 
Knight v. Commissioner, 552 U.S. 181, 128 S. Ct. 782 (2008), 
generated a difference of opinion with Chief Justice Roberts 
concerning the proper interpretation of § 67(e)(1).  
 
The issue in Rudkin was whether investment advisory fees 
incurred by a trust are “miscellaneous itemized deductions,” 
deductible only to the extent that they (and other such deductions) 
exceed 2% of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.  The relevant 
statutory provision, § 67(e)(1), provides that the expenses of a trust 
are not treated as miscellaneous itemized deductions if the expenses 
“would not have been incurred if the property were not held in trust.”2 
 
The language of the statute is not susceptible of easy 
application because it refers to a counterfactual.  The language 
directs us to assume that the property in question, which is in fact 
held by a trust, is not held by a trust.  We are then to determine 
whether, in those hypothetical, counterfactual circumstances, the 
owner would have incurred the expenses.  Instead of applying the law 
to facts that have occurred, we are asked to apply the law to 
counterfactuals and imagine what would have occurred had the facts 
been counter to what they were.  
 
Given such problematic language, as well as an absence of 
clear legislative intent, it is unsurprising that courts of appeal 
disagreed about the meaning of § 67(e)(1).  The Sixth Circuit 
interpreted the language to mean that all expenses attributable to a 
trustee’s fiduciary were expenses that “would not have been incurred 
if the property were not held in trust.”  Therefore, the Sixth Circuit 
held that investment advisory fees incurred by a trust qualified under  
§ 67(e)(1) because a trustee has a fiduciary duty to obtain investment 
advice.  O’Neill v. Commssioner, 994 F.2d 302. (6th Cir. 1993).  On 
                                       
2 If exempted from the miscellaneous itemized deductions category, 
such expenses are fully deductible from gross income for the purpose 
of calculating adjusted gross income. 
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the other hand, the Federal Circuit held that § 67(e)(1) applies only to 
expenses that are “not customarily incurred outside of trusts 
[emphasis added].”  Therefore, because investment advisory fees are 
customarily incurred by individuals, such fees do not fall under 
§ 67(e)(1).  Mellon Bank, N.A. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1275  
(Fed. Cir. 2001).  The Fourth Circuit agreed, ruling that investment 
advisory fees do not qualify because they are customarily incurred 
outside the context of trust administration.  Scott v. United States, 
328 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 2003).  
 
Judge Sotomayor properly rejected the Sixth Circuit’s 
construction of Section 67(e)(1) as contrary to the language of that 
provision, which asks, not whether the expenses were incurred 
because of the trustee’s fiduciary duty, but rather whether the 
expenses would have been incurred had the property been held by 
an individual owner: 
 
[T]he phrase “if such property were not held in 
trust” more logically directs the inquiry away 
from the trust and back toward the 
hypothetical ownership of property by an 
individual . . . .  It focuses the inquiry, instead, 
on the hypothetical situation where the assets 
are in the hands of an individual.  467 F.3d 
155. 
 
She was concerned, however, that the construction adopted by 
the Federal and Fourth Circuits—focusing on whether an individual 
owner would customarily incur the expenses—involves a subjective 
and uncertain standard.  She argued that “the statute demands not a 
“subjective” inquiry “but rather an objective determination of whether 
the particular cost is one that is peculiar to trusts and one that 
individuals are incapable of incurring.”  467 F. 3d 156: 
 
While the Federal and Fourth Circuits’ 
approach properly focuses the inquiry on the 
hypothetical situation of costs incurred by 
individuals as opposed to trusts, that inquiry 
into whether a given cost is “customarily” or 
“commonly” incurred by individuals is 
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unnecessary and less consistent with the 
statutory language.  We believe that the plain 
text of § 67(e) requires that we determine with 
certainty that costs could not have been 
incurred if the property were held by an 
individual.  We therefore hold that the plain 
meaning of the statute permits a trust to take 
a full deduction only for those costs that could 
not have been incurred by an individual 
property owner.  467 F.3d 156.3 
 
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s 
decision but preferred the construction of Section 67(e)(1) adopted by 
the Federal and Fourth Circuits: that Section 67(e)(1) exempts 
expenses that would not customarily be incurred if an individual 
owned the property held in trust.  Knight v. Commissioner, 552 U.S. 
181, ___; 128 S. Ct. 782, 789 (2008).  
 
Chief Justice Roberts conceded the subjective and uncertain 
nature of the inquiry under this construction: 
 
The question whether a trust-related expense 
is fully deductible turns on a prediction about 
what would happen if a fact were changed—
specifically, if the property were held by an 
individual rather than a trust.  In the context of 
making such a prediction, when there is 
uncertainty about the answer, the word 
“would” is best read as “express[ing] concepts 
such as custom, habit, natural disposition, or 
probability,” [citations omitted]. . . .The text 
requires determining what would happen if a 
fact were changed; such an exercise 
                                       
3 Examples of such costs that individuals are incapable of incurring 
are “fees paid to trustees, expenses associated with judicial 
accountings, the costs of preparing and filing fiduciary income tax 
returns.”  467 F.3d 156.   
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necessarily entail a prediction; and predictions 
are based on what would customarily or 
commonly occur.”  552 U.S. 181, ___; 128 
S.Ct. 782, 789-790. 
 
Chief Justice Roberts also criticized Judge Sotomayor’s 
reasoning: 
 
In applying the statute, the Court of Appeals 
below asked whether the cost at issue could 
have been incurred by an individual.  This 
approach flies in the face of the statutory 
language.  The provision at issue asks 
whether the costs “would not have been 
incurred if the property were not held” in trust  
. . .  not, as the Court of Appeals would have 
it, whether the costs “could not have been 
incurred in such a case . . . .  The fact that an 
individual could not do something is one 
reason he would not, but not the only possible 
reason.  If Congress had intended the Court of 
Appeals; reading, it could easily have 
replaced “would” in the statute with “could,” 
and presumably would have.”  The fact that it 
did not adopt this readily available and 
apparent alternative strongly supports 
rejecting the Court of Appeals’ reading.  552 
U.S. 181, ___, 128 S. Ct. 787. 
 
Chief Justice Roberts’ criticism of Judge Sotomayor, however, 
begs the question.  If Congress had intended his preferred reading of 
Section 67(e)(1), it could have easily inserted the word “customarily” 
in the provision.  Why, in his own words, doesn’t “[t]he fact that it did 
not adopt this readily available and apparent alternative strongly 
[support] rejecting” his reading of the provision? 
 
 In fact, there are at least two plausible readings of the 
language of Section 67(e)(1).  It could be interpreted by reading into 
the statute after the words “would not” the word “customarily.”  Or it 
could be interpreted by reading into the statute after the words “would 
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not” the word “ever.”  Either reading is plausible.  In the first case, the 
statute is interpreted to read “would not customarily have been 
incurred” and requires a subjective judgment about what is 
customary.  In the second case, the statute is interpreted to read 
“would not ever have been incurred,” and requires determining 
whether the expense was one that an individual could not incur.  
Neither Chief Justice Roberts’, nor Judge Sotomayor’s construction 
“flies in the face of the statutory language.”  Chief Justice Roberts’ 
criticism of Judge Sotomayor is unpersuasive and overstated.  
 
Justice Roberts also claimed that Judge Sotomayor 
disregarded the first clause of Section 67(e)(1), which refers to costs 
“paid or incurred in connection with the administration” of a trust.  He 
stated: 
 
[I]f the Court of Appeals' reading were correct, it is 
not clear why Congress would have included in the 
statute the first clause of § 67(e)(1). If the only costs that 
are fully deductible are those that could not be incurred 
outside the trust context-that is, that could only be 
incurred by trusts-then there would be no reason to place 
the further condition on full deductibility that the costs be 
“paid or incurred in connection with the administration of 
the ... trust,”§ 67(e)(1). We can think of no expense that 
could be incurred exclusively by a trust but would 
nevertheless not be “paid or incurred in connection with” 
its administration. 552 U.S. 181, ___, 128 S. Ct. 787. 
 
This criticism, however, itself misreads the statutory scheme by 
disregarding Section 67(e)(2).  Section 67(e) divides all trust 
deductions into two categories: (1) deductions for costs incurred in 
connection with the administration of a trust; and (2) the standard 
deduction and deductions for distributions to trust beneficiaries.  
Section 67(e)(1) requires that deductions in the first category (that is, 
deductions incurred in connection with the administration of a trust) 
“would not have been incurred if the property were not held in such 
trust.”  Section 67(e)(2), in contrast, does not impose such a “would 
not have been incurred” requirement for either the standard deduction 
or distributions to trust beneficiaries.  Thus, the purpose of the “paid 
or incurred in connection with the administration of [a] trust” language 
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in the first clause of Section 67(e)(1) is to separate deductions 
subject to the “would not have been incurred” requirement from 
specified deductions under Section 67(e)(2) that are not subject to 
that requirement.  Obviously, the first clause of Section 67(e)(1) 
serves this purpose under either Judge Sotomayor’s or Judge 
Roberts’ reading of the “would not have been incurred language” of 
the second clause of Section 67(e)(2).    
 
Both the Treasury and the Solicitor General affirmed the 
validity, and perhaps the superiority, of Judge Sotomayor’s approach.  
Following the issuance of her opinion, the Treasury proposed 
interpretive regulations adopting her reading of the statute.  In 
addition, the Solicitor General’s brief to the Supreme Court, urged 
that her second circuit opinion be approved as “an easily 
administrable rule.”  552 U.S. 181, ___, n. 3; 128 S.Ct. 782, 787, n. 3. 
 
Others have criticized Justice Roberts’ opinion for creating 
confusion and uncertainty: 
 
By adopting the Fourth and Federal Circuits' 
interpretation of the second condition of 
§ 67(e)(1), the [Supreme] Court has added to 
the confusion surrounding the exception, 
rather than clarifying its application.  By 
focusing the inquiry on what expenses are 
“uncommon (or unusual, or unlikely) for . . . a 
hypothetical individual to incur,” it is unclear 
which expenses will qualify for the exception 
and which expenses will not. While this 
standard is not as restrictive as the Second 
Circuit's interpretation, its application is more 
difficult and burdensome.  The Court's 
standard does not develop a bright line test 
subjecting all investment advisory fees to the 
2% floor. Rather, only those fees that are 
“commonly incurred by individuals” are subject 
to the floor.  During oral argument, the Court 
struggled with how the “commonly incurred” 
language would be applied to determine the 
deductibility of other expenses.  Based on the 
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lack of certainty in this standard, there is room 
to argue that certain fees incurred by a trust 
were for specialized services that are not 
commonly incurred by individuals.  In such a 
situation, the dicta in the last paragraph of the 
Court's decision may require the trustee to 
bifurcate the fee into fees commonly incurred 
by individuals and fees not commonly incurred 
by individuals.  This potential requirement, 
created by the dicta of the opinion, adds even 
more confusion to an already confusing 
standard: Those fees attributable to services 
that are common for individuals are subject to 
the 2% floor of § 67(a), while those fees 
attributable to specialized services for the trust 
and not common for individuals are not 
subject to the 2% floor and are fully deductible 
by the trust.  This standard leaves much to be 
desired.  It suggests that financial advisors 
have the burden of tracking and separating 
fees into categories of those common for 
individuals and those that are not.4   
 
Another commentator echoes this concern: 
 
[T]he Court in Knight conceded that figuring 
what costs are common is an uncertain 
exercise and even difficult to administer 
without regulatory guidance. In spite of that 
admission, it further complicated the tax 
treatment of investment advisory fees by 
declaring that such fees could merit full 
deductibility if there were special charges on 
                                       
4 Lindsay Roshkind, Interpreting I.R.C. § 67(e): The Supreme Court’s 
Attempt to Nail Investment Advisory Fees to the Floor, 60 FLA. L. REv. 
961, 970-972 (2008). 
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account of the trust's fiduciary duties.5 
 
In contrast, Judge Sotomayor’s opinion in Knight was informed 
by her awareness of and concern for the real world consequences of 
adopting one interpretation of Section 67(e)(1) or the other.  Given 
two plausible ways of reading the statute, she preferred an 
interpretation that affords more certainty and less confusion.  She 
was sensitive to the practical implications of her decision for 
taxpayers and their advisors struggling to cope with a complex and 
often badly drafted tax statute. 
                                       
5 Dean Roy, Is That the End? Section 67(e)(1) and Trust Investment 
Advisory Fees after Knight v. Commissioner, 61 TAX LAW. 321, 326 
(2007). 
 
 
